Hostile Environment Claims of Sexual Harassment: The Continuing Expansion of Sexual Harassment Law by Henken, Jill W.
Volume 34 Issue 6 Article 6 
1989 
Hostile Environment Claims of Sexual Harassment: The 
Continuing Expansion of Sexual Harassment Law 
Jill W. Henken 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jill W. Henken, Hostile Environment Claims of Sexual Harassment: The Continuing Expansion of Sexual 
Harassment Law, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 1243 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1989]
Notes
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
THE CONTINUING EXPANSION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Although sexual harassment may be relatively new to the judicial
system, it is a well established fact of life for many working women.1
Every working day many women are faced with unwelcome sexual re-
marks, unwanted physical contact, embarrassing conversations with a
boss about personal and intimate subjects, derogatory jokes, porno-
graphic magazines and posters, and demands for sexual relations with
the promise of job benefits which may or may not be accompanied by
the threat of termination for refusing to comply.2 Initially, courts were
1. Sexual harassment at the workplace is becoming an increasingly wide-
spread and widely discussed problem. See W.F. PEPPER & F.R. KENNEDY, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT 36 (1981) (studies show that anywhere from
49% to 90% of women in workforce feel they have been victims of sexual harass-
ment at work); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 n.5 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (citing Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources hearings
at which acting chairman of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cited
rising number of charges of sexual harassment filed with that agency); Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1449, 1451 (1984) (high incidence of workplace conduct perceived by wo-
men as offensive and harassing).
The first court to confront a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the District Court for the District of Columbia
in Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Barnes,
see infra note 4. Although Barnes was the first case in which sexual harassment
was alleged as a violation of Title VII, the first federal court case to find sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978). See Holtzman & Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual
Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31
ST. Louis U.L.J. 239, 266 (1987). For a discussion of Williams, see infra note 5.
2. C. LEFCOURT, WOMEN AND THE LAW (release No. 2, July 1988) § 3.02.
Defining sexual harassment has always been a difficult task. Id. For the pur-
poses of this Note, sexual harassment will be broadly defined as follows:
Sexual harassment in employment is any remark or overt behavior
of a sexual nature in the context of the work situation that has the effect
of making a woman uncomfortable on the job, impeding her ability to
do her work, or interfering with her employment opportunities. It can
,be manifested by looks, touches, jokes, innuendos, gestures, epithets,
or direct propositions. At one extreme, it is the direct demand for sex-
ual compliance coupled with the threat of firing if a woman refuses. At
the other, it is being forced to work in an environment in which,
through various means, such as sexual slurs, the public displays of de-
(1243)
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reluctant to consider these kinds of behavior as sex discrimination
within the reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 for fear that
the judicial system would be intruding in the personal area of social rela-
tionships, where judicial scrutiny traditionally has not intervened. 4
However, in 1976, a breakthrough occurred when the District Court for
the District of Columbia recognized a cause of action for sexual harass-
ment. 5 Since then, many courts, including the United States Supreme
rogatory images of women, or the requirement that she dress in re-
vealing clothing, a woman is subjected to stress or made to feel
humiliated because of her sex. Sexual harassment is behavior that be-
comes coercive because it occurs in the employment context, thus
threatening both a woman's job satisfaction and her job security.
Id. § 3.02(3); see also Linenberger, What Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harassment?, 34
LAB. L.J. 238 (1983) (further discussion of behavior constituting sexual
harassment).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
The prohibition against discrimination based upon sex is found in § 703 of
Title VII and was introduced in a "last-minute attempt" to block the passage of
Title VII. Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII. The Foundation for the Elimination
of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1010
(1978); see also Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 265 (discussing Rep. Howard
W. Smith's attempt to block passage of Title VII by adding prohibition against
sex discrimination).
However, § 717 of Title VII, added eight years later in 1972, shows that sex
discrimination in employment was indeed of great concern to Congress: "Dis-
crimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited em-
ployment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern
given to any type of unlawful discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2141.
4. See Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123. In Barnes, the court
stated:
The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated
against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to en-
gage in a sexual affair with her supervisor. This is a controversy under-
pinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship.
Regardless of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiff's supervisor
might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to continued
employment based on plaintiff's sex.
Id. at 124; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacK-
innon, J., concurring) ("We are ... concerned . . . with social patterns that to
some extent are normal and expectable. It is the abuse of the practice, rather
than the practice itself, that arouses alarm.").
One commentator has noted that in our society we must tackle "a culturally
conditioned attitude which may very well regard overtures by employers or su-
pervisors as being 'inevitable,' 'normal,' 'complementary to feminity,' and even
'socially desirable.' " W.F. PEPPER & F.R. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 35.
5. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court held that
1244 [Vol. 34: p. 1243
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Court, have upheld actions for sexual harassment. 6
Two categories of sexual harassment are now recognized by the
courts. The first includes the most blatant form of harassment, quid pro
quo harassment. 7 This encompasses situations where an employer de-
mands sexual favors from an employee, promising economic or other
tangible job benefits in return, and then denies the employee job bene-
fits or fires her when she 8 refuses to cooperate. 9 This fact pattern typi-
sexual harassment in the workplace was a form of sex discrimination, and there-
fore a violation of Title VII. Id. at 661. In Williams, the plaintiff claimed she was
sexually harassed by her supervisor. When the plaintiff refused her supervisor's
sexual advances, the supervisor eventually fired her. Id. at 655-56.
The defendants argued that Title VII did not apply to this case because the
plaintiff was fired not because she was a woman, but simply because she refused
to have sex with her boss. Id. at 657. Although the court stated that it found this
argument somewhat interesting, it did not accept the defendants' proposition
because the court believed that their argument obfuscated the facts. Id. The
court held that Title VII was not only invoked, but was violated by the supervi-
sor's conduct because the conduct "created an artificial barrier to employment
which was placed before one gender and not the other." Id.
6. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Supreme Court's
first, and so far only, sexual harassment case). For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982) (court upheld plaintiff's claim that she was sexually
harassed by supervisor's conduct which included sexually demeaning remarks
and repeated requests for sexual relations); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (court upheld plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment, even
though harassment did not result in tangible loss of job benefits, holding that
sexually demeaning remarks and propositions to which she was subjected consti-
tuted "illegal poisoning" of her conditions of employment).
7. The term "quid pro quo" harassment was coined by Professor Catherine
A. MacKinnon. Note, supra note 1, at 1454 n.27. One court described this form
of sexual harassment as follows:
The classic example of sexual harassment is the situation in which sex-
ual demands are made by a supervisor to a subordinate in exchange for
career advantages or under threat of adverse job consequences. Be-
cause tangible job consequences are involved, this type of offense has
been characterized as 'quid pro quo' sexual harassment.
Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The first case to hold this
type of harassment actionable under Title VII was Williams, 413 F. Supp. 654.
See Holtzman & Treiz, supra note 1, at 266. For a discussion of Williams, see supra
note 5.
8. For the purposes of this Note, when referring to the victim of sexual
harassment the pronoun "she" will be used. This is not meant to represent the
belief that only women can be or are victims of sexual harassment in the work-
place, for that is not the case. However, sexual harassment, an assertion of
power by a superior over a subordinate, claims a much higher percentage of
women as victims simply because more women than men occupy the inferior
employment positions. Thus, sexual harassment only as it impacts upon women
in the workforce will be explored. See, e.g., C. LEFCOURT, supra note 2,
§§ 3.03(l)-.03(2); W.F. PEPPER & F.R. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 35-36; Note,
supra note 1, at 1451.
9. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977) (plaintiff asserted claim of quid pro quo harassment after supervisor told
her that cooperation with his sexual advances was necessary for continued
employment).
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fled early sexual harassment cases. 10
The second type of harassment recognized by the courts, and the
form upon which this Note will focus, is termed hostile environment
harassment. I This cause of action involves continual subjection to sex-
ually demeaning behavior, such as derogatory sexual comments, un-
wanted touching, or a variety of other conduct of a similar nature, which
creates a hostile and offensive environment for the employee. 12
The law in this area of sexual harassment has continued to expand
since first recognized by the courts in 1981.13 This Note will trace the
development of this area of the law, examining the parameters of this
cause of action and some of its most significant developments. This
Note will also explore the implications of Broderick v. Ruder,14 a recent
hostile work environment decision which has significantly expanded sex-
ual harassment law.' 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia became
the first court to hold that subjecting an employee to a sexually hostile
10. See, e.g., Tomkins, 568 F.2d 1044 (supervisor told plaintiff cooperation
with his sexual advances was necessary if they were to have satisfactory working
relationship); Williams, 413 F. Supp. 654 (plaintiff claimed she was sexually
harassed because her refusal to tolerate supervisor's advances resulted in termi-
nation from employment).
11. Hostile work environment harassment covers a much broader range of
behavior than quid pro quo harassment. It does not require that the employee's
job status be conditioned upon her cooperation with the sexual demands of a
superior. Therefore, this theory of harassment provides legal recourse for vic-
tims of conduct as offensive and debilitating as quid pro quo propositions, who
would be unable to sue under the theory of quid pro quo harassment. See, e.g.,
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff claimed she
was victim of hostile environment sexual harassment because she was continu-
ally subjected to sexually demeaning remarks and repeated propositions for sex-
ual favors from her supervisor); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 198 1)
(plaintiff claimed sexual harassment arising from vulgar remarks and sexual pro-
positions directed to her by supervisor); see generally Note, supra note 1, at 1455.
12. See Note, supra note 1, at 1455-56 ("In essence, the employee claims
that she should not be forced, simply because she is a woman, to tolerate abusive
conditions in order to earn a living; she seeks relief from degrading conditions
continually imposed upon her.").
13. The first case to recognize a hostile environment claim of sexual harass-
ment case was Bundy, 641 F.2d 934. For a discussion of Bundy, see infra notes 18-
21 and accompanying text.
14. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988). For a discussion of Broderick, see infra
notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
15. The Broderick case has been hailed as "a significant extension of sexual
harassment protections." Woman Was Sexually Harassed at SEC, Judge Rules, Phila-
delphia Inquirer, May 15, 1988, at 12-A, col. 1.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/6
1989] NOTE 1247
working environment' 6 violated Title VII, even though the employee
was not deprived of any economic or other tangiblejob benefit for refus-
ing to tolerate the harassing conditions. 17 In Bundy v. Jackson,I8 the
plaintiff's supervisors repeatedly asked her for sexual favors. 19 The
court held that this conduct violated Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination with respect to the terms, conditions and privileges of
16. The words "hostile," "offensive" and "abusive" are used interchangea-
bly by courts that have decided cases involving this form of harassment.
The term "hostile work environment" was derived from the EEOC's Guide-
lines on Sexual Harassment, issued in 1980 and codified in Title 29 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, § 1604.11, which state in pertinent part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of
Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604,11(a) (1986).
17. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44. In Bundy, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia termed this issue a "novel question." Id. at 943. The court
found that the plaintiff did have an actionable claim of sexual harassment within
the reach of Title VII, noting that it was the first court to so hold. Id.
Historically, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has been in-
strumental in the area of sexual discrimination. In Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), it was one of the first courts to recognize a cause of action
for sexual harassment. See Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 266. Barnes in-
volved a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment by an Environmental Protec-
tion Agency administrative assistant against her supervisor, the administrator of
that agency, alleging that he had repeatedly requested sexual favors from her,
telling her that if she cooperated he would provide her with additional job bene-
fits. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984-85. When the plaintiff refused these advances, the
supervisor retaliated by firing her. Id. at 985.
The district court concluded that there was no actionable discrimination,
stating that the plaintiff's suit merely amounted to a claim that she was discrimi-
nated against not because of her sex but because she refused to have a sexual
relationship with her supervisor. Id. at 986. The court of appeals disagreed and
held that this type of harassment was a form of sex discrimination because the
plaintiff's "participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited" but
for her "womanhood." Id. at 990. The court of appeals stated that "the statu-
tory embargo on sex discrimination . . . is not confined to differentials founded
wholly upon an employee's gender." Id. The court stated that "it is enough that
gender is a factor contributing to the discrimination in a substantial way." Id.
(footnote omitted).
18. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 940. In Bundy, the plaintiff alleged that one supervisor continually
requested that she spend the afternoon with him at his apartment and ques-
tioned her about her sexual proclivities, and that another supervisor made re-
peated sexual advances toward her and asked her to stay in a motel with him in
the Bahamas. Id. Upon complaining to the supervisors of these two men, the
plaintiff was told that "any man in his right mind would want to rape you." Id.
5
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employment.2 0 The court stated that a person's psychological well-be-
ing is a protected condition of employment, and determined that the
plaintiff was psychologically affected by the harassing conduct she de-
scribed. 2 1 Shortly after the Bundy decision, other courts began recogniz-
ing hostile work environment sexual harassment.
One year later, in Henson v. City of Dundee,2 2 the Eleventh Circuit,
adopting the reasoning set forth in Bundy, articulated five elements that
a plaintiff must prove in order to establish a prima facie case of harass-
20. Id. at 943-44. The plaintiff's claim was "essentially that 'conditions of
employment' include the psychological and emotional work environment-that
the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions to which she was
indisputably subjected and which caused her anxiety and debilitation.., illegally
poisoned that environment." Id. at 944. To interpret what is covered by
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," the Bundy court looked to the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), in which the plaintiff claimed a violation of Title VII
resulting from an offensive working environment created by a practice of racial
discrimination. The Rogers court stated that the language of Title VII "should
be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Con-
gress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation" of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 238. The court then stated that "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment' . . . is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ... discrimination." Id. For further discussion of Rogers, see infra note 21.
21. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944-46. The court stated that this result "follows
ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations where an employer
created or condoned a substantially [racially] discriminatory work environment,
regardless whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a
result of the discrimination." Id. at 943-44 (emphasis in original).
Rogers is the seminal case regarding racially discriminatory work environ-
ment claims. See Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 246 n.44. In Rogers, the
EEOC, representing a Spanish surnamed woman employed by an optical com-
pany, charged the owners of that company with discrimination based upon na-
tional origin. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236. The employee alleged that, among other
things, her employers "segregat[ed] the patients." Id. The court of appeals
stated that Title VII should be interpreted liberally and declared that the psy-
chological conditions of the workplace were entitled to protection under Title
VII because the "terms, conditions, and privileges" language of Title VII is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass the "practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." Id. at 238. Thus, the court
concluded that creating a discriminatory work environment constituted an ille-
gal employment practice. Id. at 239.
The employers argued that the plaintiffs allegation was not within the statu-
tory protection of Title VII because it did not assert action directed toward any
employee, but only toward the employers' patients. Id. at 238. The court deter-
mined that "absence of discriminatory intent by an employer does not redeem
an otherwise unlawful employment practice, and that the thrust of Title VII's
proscriptions is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice
and not at the employer's motivation." Id. at 239.
22. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
1248
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ment: 2 3 (1) the employee must belong to a protected group; 24 (2) the
employee must have been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; 2 5
(3) the harassment must have been based upon the sex of the em-
ployee; 26 (4) the harassment must have affected a term, privilege or con-
dition of employment;2 7 and (5) respondeat superior must be
23. Id. at 903-05. This court appears to have been one of the first to articu-
late these elements. See Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 242 n.20. Although
the court never mentioned how it determined that these elements were essential
to a hostile environment claim, it is almost certain that the court relied upon the
disparate treatment formula for guidance because the court concluded that sex-
ual harassment fell within the disparate treatment category of discrimination.
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 902; Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 242 n.20. For
further discussion of the disparate treatment formula and sexual harassment, see
infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
24. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. This element is satisfied merely by a statement
that the employee is a woman or a man. Id.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986)
("[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual ad-
vances were 'unwelcome' "); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805
F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (court determined that plaintiff, who said she
"didn't think [the alleged harassment] was that big of a deal," failed to show she
was significantly offended, and could not prevail on claim).
26. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. Courts usually state that the harassment would
not have occurred but for the sex of the employee. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rub-
ber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (harassment that would not occur
but for sex of employee may be actionable if sufficiently patterned and perva-
sive); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff must prove that harassment would not have occurred but for her sex), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (in typical case in which
male supervisor makes sexual advances to female worker, it is obvious that su-
pervisor did not treat male employees in similar fashion, and therefore it is sim-
ple for plaintiff to prove that but for her sex, harassment would not have
occurred).
This element encompasses the aspect of intent. It is notable, however, that
the employer's intent in discriminating based on the employee's sex is rarely, if
ever, mentioned in the cases. This is probably due to the fact that, as one stu-
dent commentator noted, "[t]here is no point in litigating the motive behind
sexual harassment; by definition, sexual harassment occurs because of the
harassed employee's sex." Note, supra note 1, at 1456. If the plaintiff shows that
the harassment would not have occurred but for her sex, then it is a logical
inference that the discriminatory practice was intentional. See, e.g., Henson, 682
F.2d at 904.
Because the disparate treatment model of discrimination, which was used in
Henson and has so strongly influenced the development of sexual harassment
law, focuses on the employer's intent, some courts and commentators have con-
cluded that it is not an appropriate model for analysis of hostile work environ-
ment cases. Consequently, those courts do not adhere rigidly to the five-prong
test or the order of proof formulated by the disparate treatment model as
adapted to sexual discrimination cases.
27. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; see, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (sexual harass-
ment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect plaintiff's working condi-
tions and create hostile or abusive environment); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 650
(court must look to totality of circumstances to determine whether alleged har-
assment created hostile working environment that significantly affected plain-
tiff's psychological well-being).
7
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established. 28
The plaintiff in Henson claimed she was forced to work in a hostile
and offensive environment because she was continually subjected to
"demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities," and was repeatedly pro-
positioned throughout her two-year employment as a police dis-
patcher. 29 Because the plaintiff made a showing of all five elements, the
court held that she had established a prima facie case of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.3 0 This five-prong test has been applied by
many courts in analyzing hostile environment claims. 3 '
In Katz v. Dole,3 2 the Fourth Circuit took a different approach to the
28. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. This element has been the subject of much
debate among the courts. Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 263. Several dif-
ferent standards for employer liability have been suggested. Compare Meritor,
411 U.S. at 69-73 (Supreme Court declined to rule on liability of bank, but did
state that employer was not always strictly liable for actions of supervisor, and
advocated looking to agency principles for standards of liability) with Henson, 682
F.2d at 910 (court held employer strictly liable for acts of supervisor in cases of
quid pro quo harassment, but required proof that employer knew or should have
known of harassment to apply strict liability in hostile work environment cases)
and Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (court held
employer strictly liable for actions of supervisor where supervisor had authority
to "hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend
such actions," even if supervisor violated company policy) and Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court allowed employer to escape liability by
showing that supervisor contravened company policy without employer's knowl-
edge, and that employer took corrective action as soon as situation was discov-
ered). For further discussion of employer liability in sexual harassment cases,
see Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 263-86; Note, supra note 3, at 1025-31,
Note, supra note 1, at 1460-63.
29. Henson, 682 F.2d at 899.
30. Id. at 905.
31. Courts that have expressly employed the Henson five-prong test include:
Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648; Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);Jones v. Flagship Int'l,
793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 527-28 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Some courts, though in effect requiring the elements, do not articulate all
five in their opinions. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th
Cir. 1987); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Furthermore,
some courts do not even speak in terms of elements at all and discuss only the
requirement that a plaintiff establish that the conduct was sufficiently pervasive
and offensive to create a hostile working environment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. 57;
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). This may be a result of the fact that,
over time, several elements have become self-evident. As an example, most
courts no longer mention the first element, that the plaintiff be a member of a
protected group, since all that is necessary to satisfy this requirement is a state-
ment that the plaintiff is a man or a woman. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. Also,
respondeat superior may not be listed by a court as an element to be proved, but
it is clearly necessary in any case where a plaintiff attempts to hold an employer
liable for the actions of an employee. See id. at 905 ("[w]here ... plaintiff seeks
to hold the employer responsible for the hostile environment created by the
plaintiff's supervisor ... she must show that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment ... and failed to take prompt remedial action").
32. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
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analysis of hostile environment claims. 33 Previously, courts reasoned
that sexual harassment claims fell within the disparate treatment model
of discrimination. 34 Disparate treatment is a form of discrimination in
which an employer treats certain employees "less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '" 3 5 This
model of discrimination influences both the elements of a plaintiff's
claim and the order of proof in sexual harassment cases. Under this
approach, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence. 36 The burden then shifts to
the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for the employment decision or practice. 37 The plaintiff then must show
33. Id. at 255-56. In Katz, the plaintiff, an air traffic controller, filed a hos-
tile work environment claim based on her repeated subjection to "sexual slur,
insult and innuendo ... [and the] vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets
addressed to and employed about [her] by supervisory personnel as well as by
other controllers." Id. at 254. The court held that the atmosphere described by
the plaintiff constituted hostile environment harassment, and that the plaintiff
was thus subjected to sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 256.
34. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 902 (pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon
employee because of employee's sex is disparate treatment with respect to
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
35. Note, supra note 3, at 1019 n.93.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court set forth the elements of a disparate treatment claim in a
case involving racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qual-
ified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Proof of the discriminatory intent of the employer is essential to a
disparate treatment claim, and "can in some situations be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The McDonnell Court acknowl-
edged that these elements would vary depending on the facts of the case at
hand, and it is evident that courts have adjusted them to fit the fact patterns of
sexual harassment claims. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 nn. 13 & 14; see Henson, 682
F.2d at 911, n.22. For the Henson court's application of the McDonnell elements
to a sexual harassment case, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the view that the disparate treatment approach is inappropriate for
analysis of hostile work environment claims, see infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
There is also another form of discrimination called disparate impact dis-
crimination. This occurs when an employment practice appears neutral on its
face but in actuality discriminates against a group of employees because of their
race, religion, sex, ethnicity or any other legally prohibited basis. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is not required in the disparate impact approach. Note, supra
note 3, at 1019-20 n.93.
36. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. For a discussion of the elements com-
prising the plaintiff's prima facie case, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying
text.
37. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
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that the reason given by the defendant was pretextual.3 8 Many early
courts and legal commentators considered the disparate treatment anal-
ysis to be a useful framework for evaluating quid pro quo claims of sex-
ual harassment.3 9 When the theory of hostile work environment
harassment began to evolve, some courts attempted to apply the dispa-
rate treatment approach to these claims as well.
40
The Katz court, however, concluded that the disparate treatment
formula was unsuitable for the plaintiff's, or any other, hostile environ-
ment claim. 4 1 The court did not specifically address the Henson ele-
ments of a prima facie claim, although it required them in effect, and
formulated a different order of proof.4 2 The court seemed to state that
a prima facie case is established by the plaintiff's showing that sexual
advances, insults or other sexually harassing conduct occurred. 43 The
employer may rebut this evidence by showing that the alleged events
never happened, were merely isolated, or were insignificant. 4 4 The
38. Id. at 804-05 (plaintiff must be allowed opportunity to prove that rea-
sons given by defendant in support of employment decision or practice were
cover-up for discriminatory motivations).
39. See Note, supra note 3, at 1020 n.93; see also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other ground sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Williams, see supra note 5.
40. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
41. Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56. Focusing on the order of proof dictated by
the disparate treatment model, the court concluded that it was not suitable for
hostile environment claims because it revolved around the discriminatory intent
of the employer. Id. at 255. The court stated:
In the usual case involving allegations of disparate treatment, once the
plaintiff establishes that he or she was disadvantaged in fact by some
employment decision or practice, the crux of the matter is the question
of motive: was there an intent to discriminate along legally impermissi-
ble lines such as race or gender?
Id.
In hostile environment cases, "the sexual advance or insult almost always
will represent 'an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy.' " Id.
(quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (emphasis ad-
ded). Therefore, a showing of discriminatory intent is unnecessary. For discus-
sion of the disparate treatment approach and the requirement of intent, see
supra note 26.
The disparate treatment model of discrimination is, however, considered
well suited for analysis of quid pro quo claims of sexual harassment. Note, supra
note 1, at 1454. In such claims, proof of a discriminatory reason for the supervi-
sor's or employer's action is central to the plaintiff's case. See id. ("quid pro quo
harassment constitutes sex discrimination . . . when it erects an employment
barrier for workers of one sex but not for workers of the other"). For examples
of quid pro quo cases influenced by the disparate treatment approach, see Tom-
kins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams, 413
F. Supp. 654.
42. Often courts do not specifically address the Henson elements, but re-
quire them in effect. For a discussion of the various approaches of the courts in
adhering to the Henson elements, see supra note 31.
43. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
44. Id. at 255-56.
[Vol. 34: p. 12431252
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court concluded that the plaintiff proved her case by showing that she
was subjected to genuine and significant sexual harassment of which the
employer was, or should have been, aware and took no corrective
action. 4
5
A significant interpretation of the parameters of a sexual harass-
ment claim occurred two years after Katz, in McKinney v. Dole.4 6 The
McKinney court analyzed the question of whether an act, non-sexual in
nature, may be considered as part of the harassing conduct in the evalu-
ation of a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. 4 7 In McKin-
ney, the plaintiff based her hostile environment claim in part on an
incident in which her supervisor grabbed and twisted her arm.48 The
court stated that an incident need not have sexual overtones or involve
sexuality in an overt or obvious way in order to qualify as sexual harass-
ment.4 9 The court held that the arm-grabbing incident was a form of
sexual harassment because it would not have occurred but for the plain-
45. Id. at 256. Regarding proof of respondeat superior, the court stated
that the plaintiff must show that the employer is liable by proving that the em-
ployer knew of the harassment, or should have known of it, and took no steps to
remedy the situation. Id. The employer may rebut this evidence by showing
that prompt action was taken to correct the situation. Id.
46. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
47. Id. at 1131-32.
48. The plaintiff brought a hostile environment claim based upon several
incidents of harassment. Id. The incident upon which the court's attention was
focused occurred during a meeting between the plaintiff and her boss. Id. at
1132. They argued and as the plaintiff attempted to leave the office, the supervi-
sor grabbed and twisted her arm causing physical injury. Id. The defendant
argued that summary judgment should be granted in his favor because the plain-
tiff did not allege that there were sexual overtones connected to this incident.
Id. at 1136-37.
It was essential to the plaintiff's case that this incident be considered in the
court's evaluation of her claim, apparently because she alleged only a small
number of other incidents of harassment. See id. at 1132. Under the totality of
the circumstances test, without the addition of the arm-grabbing incident, it was
likely that the court would have determined that the incidents were too isolated
or insignificant to constitute harassment. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l
Management, 805 F.2d 644, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff may not rely on
single isolated event or comment but must prove injury resulted from conduct
that occurred frequently); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138 (harassment must be pat-
terned or pervasive to constitute violation of Title VII); Katz, 709 F.2d at 256
(employer may rebut claim of harassment by showing that incidents were iso-
lated or insignificant); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir.
1982) (sexual harassment must be sufficiently pervasive to create hostile working
environment, and determination of pervasiveness is based on totality of
circumstances).
Because sexuality was not involved in the arm-grabbing incident, the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. McKinney, 765 F.2d at
1137. The court of appeals reversed. Id. at 1140.
49. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138. The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that physical force toward an employee did not constitute sexual harass-
ment unless it was somehow sexually oriented. Id. The court called this
argument legally flawed. Id.
1989] NOTE 1253
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tiff's sex. 50
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court heard a sexual harass-
ment claim for the first time in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.5 1 The
Court, confirming principles used by the courts of appeals in hostile en-
vironment cases, 52 held that the plaintiff had established a hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim. 53 Among these principles, the Court
50. Id. It was the court's opinion that the physical aggression exhibited by
the supervisor would not have surfaced if the same argument had transpired
between the supervisor and a male employee. Id. at 1139-40. The court
phrased its holding in these terms: "[W]e hold that any harassment or other
unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees ... may, if sufficiently
patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title
VII." Id. at 1138.
In a footnote to the above statement, the court of appeals noted that the
district court, in support of its conclusion that sexual harassment had not oc-
curred, cited the definition of sexual harassment set forth in the EEOC's Guide-
lines on Sexual Harassment. Id. at 1138-39 n.20. The Guidelines employ the
terms "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature" to define sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)
(1982). The court of appeals, acknowledging that the Guidelines were owed
judicial deference, stated:
[E]ven assuming that harassment that is caused by an employee's sex
but that is not overtly sexual does not fall within the EEOC's definition
of sexual harassment, we do not believe that an EEOC regulation that
identifies certain activities as prohibited by Title VII can or should be
taken to mean that any other activities are allowed. Thus we look di-
rectly to the words of the statute for guidance.
McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138-39 n.20.
51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). To date, this is the only sexual harassment case
heard by the United States Supreme Court.
52. Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 256; see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-69.
The Court also reaffirmed the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment. For the
relevant text of these guidelines, see supra note 16.
53. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68. In Meritor, the plaintiff, a bank employee,
alleged that her supervisor made demands to her for sexual favors. Id. at 60.
The plaintiff submitted to these demands out of "fear of losing her job," and
estimated that she and her supervisor had sexual intercourse "some forty or fifty
times." Id. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant had raped her over her
four-year course of employment at the bank. Id.
The district court, in finding that the plaintiff had not been sexually
harassed, stated that " '[i]f [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] did engage in an
intimate or sexual relationship during the time of [the plaintiff's] employment
with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with
her continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at
that institution.' " Id. at 61 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Both the court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court held that
the district court's determination was insufficient to dispose of her claim because
the finding was "likely based on one or both of two" incorrect interpretations of
the law. Id. at 67. The district court erroneously believed that every cause of
action for sexual harassment had to include some tangible economic loss to the
plaintiff. Id. at 67-68. However, this is a necessary element only of quid pro quo
cases, and thus the district court never considered the plaintiff's claim under the
hostile work environment theory. Id.
The district court also was incorrect in inquiring as to the voluntariness of
1254
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recognized (1) that Title VII is not limited to cases of economic or tangi-
ble discrimination; 54 (2) that there are at least two types of sexual har-
assment-quid pro quo and hostile working environment; 55 (3) that an
actionable hostile work environment claim requires a showing by the
plaintiff that the harassment was severe enough to interfere with the
plaintiff's ability to work effectively, thus creating an abusive or hostile
working environment; 56 (4) that the essence of any sexual harassment
claim is the offensiveness of the alleged harassing conduct;5 7 and
(5) that the existence of sexual harassment must be determined by an
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. 58
Shortly after the Meritor decision, the Sixth Circuit, in Rabidue v. Os-
ceola Refining Co.,59 introduced the hypothetical reasonable person stan-
dard into the evaluation of hostile work environment claims. 60 The
the plaintiff's involvement in the sexual relationship with her supervisor. Id. at
68. The Court stated that the "correct inquiry [was] whether [the plaintiff] by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not
whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." Id. Con-
sequently the Court remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 73.
54. Id. at 64. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited the EEOC
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment which "fully support the view that harassment
leading to noneconomic injury [could] violate Title VII." Id. at 65.
55. Id. In support of the existence of a hostile work environment cause of
action, the Court discussed Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66. Rogers was "apparently
the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work
environment." Id. at 65. For a discussion of Rogers, see supra notes 20-21.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
57. Id. at 68 (citing the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (a) (1982)). Because the essence of a hostile work environment claim
is that the conduct is unwelcome, the voluntariness of an employee's participa-
tion in sexual relations is irrelevant to the case. Id.
58. Id. at 69.
59. 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
60. The introduction of the hypothetical reasonable person standard was
presumably an attempt to bring to the law of sexual harassment a basis of objec-
tivity for the evaluation of the offensiveness of the alleged harassing behavior.
See id. For a plaintiff to prevail under this standard, she must prove that a rea-
sonable person's psychological well-being would have been affected by the same
or similar circumstances. Id.
This standard has been assailed on the principle that it cannot accurately
reflect the perceptions of both the harasser and the victim, as it is assumed to do,
because men and women often have differing perceptions as to what is appropri-
ate sexual behavior. Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Har-
assment Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1129 (1986). As one commentator noted:
"If women and men always communicated their sexual interests and
desires in the same manner, or if they understood each other's commu-
nications, they could, in fact, be represented by the same hypothetical
person ....
Behavior is not so accurately perceived, however; a gender gap in
sexual communications exists. Men and women frequently misinter-
pret the intent of [the opposite sex]."
Id. (quoting Weiner, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Stan-
13
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court believed this standard to be the most equitable method of evaluat-
ing the offensiveness of the alleged harassment. 6 1 The court held that
regardless of how offended the plaintiff was, it must be clear that the
conduct would have interfered with the hypothetical reasonable per-
son's ability to function effectively in the same or similar environment. 6 2
If not, the plaintiff will not prevail on her claim.63
In Rabidue, the plaintiff alleged she was sexually harassed by a co-
worker who made "obscene comments about women generally, and, on
occasion, . . [directed] obscenities . . .to the plaintiff."'64 The court
determined that the plaintiff did not show that her working environment
was sufficiently hostile to constitute actionable harassment.6 5 It was the
court's opinion that women must expect a certain amount of demeaning
conduct in certain work environments. 6 6 The court concluded that the
dard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 143, 147 (1983)). For a further discussion of
the disadvantages of the reasonable person standard in evaluating sexual harass-
ment cases, see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
61. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court stated that it adopted this standard
"[tlo accord appropriate protection to both plaintiffs and defendants." Id.
62. Id. In making this assessment, the court listed several subjective and
objective factors to be considered:
[T]he nature of the alleged conduct, the background and experience of
the plaintiff, her co-workers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical
environment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that
pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after the
plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable
expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment.
Id.
63. Id. Evidence that the plaintiff's psychological well-being was seriously
affected must also be shown for the claim to be successful. Id.
64. Id. at 615. In addition to the defendant's obscenities, the plaintiff was
exposed to "pictures of nude and scantily clad women" displayed in the office.
Id.
In describing the defendant co-worker, the court stated that "[he] was an
extremely vulgar and crude individual.... Management was aware of [his] vul-
garity, but had been unsuccessful in curbing his offensive personality traits dur-
ing the time encompassed by this controversy." Id. The court described the
plaintiff in equally unflattering terms:
The plaintiff's supervisors and co-employees with whom plaintiff inter-
acted almost uniformly found her to be an abrasive, rude, antagonistic,
extremely willful, uncooperative, and irascible personality. She consist-
ently argued with co-workers and company customers .... She disre-
garded supervisory instruction and company policy whenever such
direction conflicted with her personal reasoning and conclusions. In
sum, the plaintiff was a troublesome employee.
Id. The plaintiff was terminated from her position and brought a discriminatory
discharge claim in this same action. Id. at 618.
65. Id. at 623.
66. Id. at 620-22. The Sixth Circuit quoted the language of the district
court with approval:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environ-
ments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexualjokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was
not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgotten that
1256
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incidents the plaintiff described were within this amount of expected
harassment.6 7 Further, the court held that the hypothetical reasonable
person would not have been significantly affected by the same or similar
circumstances.
6 8
B. Broderick v. Ruder: The Expansion of Sexual Harassment Law
Recently, the District Court for the District of Columbia expanded
the law of sexual harassment in Broderick v. Ruder.69 In 1988, the Broder-
Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employ-
ment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite
different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers. Clearly, the
Court's qualification is necessary to enable 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) to
function as a workable judicial standard.
Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430
(E.D. Mich. 1984)).
67. Id. at 622.
68. Id. Judge Keith, concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed that
the plaintiff established the existence of a sexually hostile work environment. Id.
at 623 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He concluded that
"[t]he overall circumstances of plaintiff's workplace evince an anti-female envi-
ronment." Id. (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He criticized
the majority's adoption of the hypothetical reasonable person's perspective for
evaluation of these claims. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Keith favored the reasonable victim perspective. Id. (Keith,J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
The reasonable victim standard evaluates behavior and circumstances from
the viewpoint of the reasonable victim. Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 258.
It is necessarily a subjective standard. Id. Judge Keith believed this to be a nec-
essary change from the reasonable person standard because "the reasonable
person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence between most wo-
men's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men." Rabidue, 805
F.2d at 626 (Keith,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Keith stated:
[T]he perspective of the reasonable victim . . . simultaneously allows
courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield em-
ployers from the neurotic complainant. Moreover, unless the outlook
of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the
courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behav-
ior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.
Id. (Keith,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The reasonable victim stan-
dard has received much attention from legal commentators but has not yet been
adopted by a court. See, e.g., Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 1, at 257; Note, supra
note 1, at 1459; Note, supra note 60, at 1129-30. In fact,Judge Keith's dissent in
Rabidue appears to be the first and only time it has been mentioned in a court
opinion. Courts continue to employ the reasonable person's reaction to similar
circumstances. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d
644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (court concluded that it first must determine whether
reasonable person would have been significantly affected by alleged conduct,
and, if plaintiff satisfies that burden, court must determine if plaintiff herself was
offended by conduct); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525,
530 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("Title VII liability attaches when the case is proved as to
the reasonable person, and it does not extend further based on any hypersensi-
tivity of a particular plaintiff.") (citations omitted).
69. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988). For further information about this
1989] 1257NOTE
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ick court became the first court to recognize a hostile work environment
claim based on conduct which was not specifically directed toward the
plaintiff7" or toward women in the office in general. 7 '
In Broderick, the plaintiff, a female staff attorney with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), claimed she was forced to tolerate a
work environment in which it was obvious to the entire office staff that
employees who were involved in relationships with supervisory person-
nel received job benefits in exchange. 72 The plaintiff argued that this
atmosphere created a hostile work environment. 73 The SEC maintained
that Title VII did not apply to this case because only "social/sexual in-
teractions between and among employees" were involved, not discrimi-
nation based upon sex.74 The court evaluated the totality of the
circumstances and concluded that a prima facie case of sexual harass-
ment was established because "[t]he evidence at trial established that
case and its actors, see SEC Agrees to Outside Review in Sexual Harassment Case,
Washington Post, June 17, 1988, at Al, col. 2; Woman Was Sexually Harassed at
SEC, Judge Rules, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1988, at 12-A, col. 1.
70. The plaintiff did claim she was the target of sexual harassment on two
occasions. She stated that on one occasion the regional administrator, drunk at
an office party, untied her sweater and kissed her. The plaintiff also said that the
regional administrator and another supervisor "made sexually suggestive re-
marks about her dress and figure." Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273-74. The
court did not emphasize these incidents, calling them isolated, and placed
greater weight on the fact that the plaintiff was forced to work in an environment
in which sexual relations were exchanged for job benefits. Id. at 1278.
71. The plaintiff did not claim that there were overt signs of a derogatory
and discriminatory attitude toward the female employees, such as, for example,
openly displayed pictures of nude women, verbal abuse, sexual innuendo and so
forth.
72. Id. Among the relationships recited by the plaintiff, one involved a cler-
ical worker and her supervisor, an assistant regional administrator. Id. at 1275.
In the period of one year the clerical worker received a $300 cash award, two
promotions and perfect scores on her annual performance evaluation. Id. An-
other relationship, although not shown to be sexual in nature, involved another
assistant regional administrator and a staff attorney. They socialized together
frequently and the administrator had promoted the attorney's career by advanc-
ing her from a grade of GS-I I to GS-14 in just over two years. Id. at 1274. The
plaintiff argued that it was the pervasiveness of such highly offensive behavior-
the exchange of sexual relations for job benefits-that created a sexually hostile
working environment which significantly affected her psychological well-being
and interfered with her ability to perform her job responsibilities. Id. at 1273.
She stated that the conduct "poisoned any possibility of her having the proper
professional respect for her supervisors and affected her motivation and per-
formance ofjob responsibilities." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1280. For a discussion of the applications of Title VII, see supra
note 3. The SEC further argued that the plaintiff was paranoid in feeling sexu-
ally harassed by exposure to relationships between supervisors and employees.
Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1280. The court stated that this argument was "unac-
ceptable," and went on to say that "[h]owever relaxed one's views of sexual mo-
rality may be in a different context, such views do not cover the pattern of
conduct disclosed by the record in this case." Id.
16
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such conduct of a sexual nature was so pervasive at the [regional office]
that it [could] reasonably be said [to have] created a hostile or offensive
work environment." 75 Thus, the court concluded that the "exchange
[of consensual sexual relations] for tangible employment benefits ...
create[s] and contribute[s] to a sexually hostile working en-
vironment." 7 6
III. ANALYSIS
The law of sexual harassment has experienced tremendous growth
over the last decade. What started out on hesitant and unsure footing
has become a well-accepted cause of action, firmly entrenched as a part
of the law of sex discrimination and constantly expanding in its defini-
tion and reach, encompassing many forms of conduct and injury.
Broderick is potentially a very significant development in this area of
the law. It represents the first time that a court has decided a hostile
work environment case not upon the incidents of harassment directed at
the plaintiff, but squarely upon the nature of the environment itself.77
75. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278. In evaluating the totality of the circum-
stances, the court considered the testimony of other SEC employees regarding
the working atmosphere to which the plaintiff and the other employees were
subjected. Id. Three of the supervisors whom Broderick charged with sexual
harassment also testified at the trial. Of their testimony, the court said "[w]ith
due consideration for the compromising position in which they found them-
selves, we find [their] testimony ...less than forthright and .0. . in material
respects false and incredible .... [W]e regard the testimony of all these wit-
nesses as deserving of little credence." Id. at 1275; see also Woman Was Sexually
Harassed at SEC, Judge Rules, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1988, at 12-A, col. 1.
76. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1280. Broderick resulted in a court-approved
settlement called "unheard of" in terms of the extent of the relief granted. SEC
Agrees to Outside Review in Sexual Harassment Case, Washington Post, June 17, 1988,
at AI, col. 2. Broderick was awarded back pay and interest, which although not
yet calculated, is estimated to be between $35,000 and $50,000; attorneys' fees;
a promotion to the GS- 15 level and her choice of a new position with either the
SEC's Enforcement Division or the General Counsel's Office; and the removal of
negative performance evaluations from her personnel file. Id.
In addition, the SEC is permanently enjoined from retaliating against Brod-
erick, and it may not create or condone a sexually hostile work environment, nor
refuse to investigate charges of sexual harassment, nor refuse to discipline those
found responsible for sexual harassment. Id.
The SEC has also agreed to educate its employees about sexual harassment
and to hire an outside consultant to investigate the conduct of the three supervi-
sors involved in Broderick's suit and recommend disciplinary action. Id. It is
interesting to note the court's conclusion that "[e]ven a woman who was never
herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced
to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive." Id. at 1278
(quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
77. See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1280. In previous cases, successful plain-
tiffs were those who claimed that specific harassing incidents, directed toward
them, were sufficiently pervasive to affect the conditions of employment in viola-
tion of Title VII. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (plaintiff made showing that supervisor directed crude and vulgar lan-
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By evaluating the nature of the work environment, the Broderick ap-
proach gives the totality of the circumstances greater effect, allowing the
court more freedom to consider and weigh all aspects of the work envi-
ronment in determining whether or not it is hostile or abusive.
78
Prior to Broderick, the totality of the circumstances appeared to be
comprised of only those incidents directed toward the plaintiff. Had the
Broderick court followed this approach, the plaintiff's cause of action
would have failed because the few instances of harassment directed at
her would have been insufficient to constitute a Title VII violation. 79 In
expanding the scope of the totality of the circumstances test, the court
relied on three cases.
80
guage to her, inquired as to her sexual habits and proclivities, and threatened to
fire her if she did not have sexual relations with him); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff demonstrated that her supervisor made sex-
ual advances to her and questioned her about her sexual proclivities).
It has been said that this decision is "a significant extension of sexual har-
assment protections" because of the fact that "[m]ost defendants [sic] who have
been successful in past cases showed that they were directly harassed and sub-
jected to sexual discrimination." Woman Was Sexually Harassed at SEC, Judge Rules,
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1988, at 12-A, col. 1. In this case, Broderick was
victimized by what went on around her in the office. Id.
78. In previous cases, the most important consideration for the courts was
the character and frequency of the harassing conduct that was directed specifi-
cally to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must demonstrate that "injury resulted not from a
single or isolated offensive incident, comment, or conduct, but from incidents,
comments, or conduct that occurred with some frequency"), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987); Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Management, 805 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir.
1986) (same); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (five incidents
of alleged harassing conduct by supervisor over period of three years, even if
not trivial in nature, "do not show that conduct ... has become a 'condition' of
anyone's employment"); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (plain-
tiff's employment was "conditioned by a pattern of personally directed sexual
insult and innuendo"). It was thought that such conduct would have the great-
est and most serious impact upon the plaintiff's ability to work effectively in that
environment. However, it is also likely that many plaintiffs did not attempt to
introduce evidence of the general work atmosphere, (because prior to Broderick
such evidence did not alone establish a cause of action), thus not presenting
courts with many opportunities to determine the significance of the whole envi-
ronment. When an occasional plaintiff did offer such evidence, it was not ac-
corded the same weight as the other harassing incidents. See, e.g., Rabidue, 805
F.2d at 622 n.7 (plaintiff claimed that pictures of nude women displayed in office
and vulgarity and offensiveness of supervisor's personality contributed to hostile
work environment). Obviously being the target of harassment does have an ex-
tremely serious effect on the victim. However, other occurrences in the work-
place can also have a serious impact on an individual, even when that person is
not involved in the incidents themselves.
79. The court described these incidents as "isolated." Broderick, 685 F.
Supp. at 1278.
80. Id. at 1277 (citing King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570
F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983)).
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In King v. Palmer8 1 and Toscano v. Nimmo8 2 the plaintiffs were denied
job promotions and sued their employers for sexual discrimination,
claiming that the positions were given to women who had engaged in
sexual relations with the employers. 83 Both courts determined that the
promotions were conditioned upon the granting of sexual favors and
that this condition of employment violated Title VII.8 4 It is suggested
that this conduct indicated sexual discrimination, not the more specific
discriminatory practice of sexual harassment. The conduct did not fit
within quid pro quo harassment because the denials of the promotions
were not a result of the plaintiffs' refusal to engage in sexual relations.8 5
Nor did it fit within the existing hostile work environment theory of har-
assment. At that point in time, a plaintiff had to establish patterned and
pervasive harassment directed toward her in order to state a claim for
this type of harassment, and it is clear that the promotion incidents
alone would have been insufficient for that purpose.
In Priest v. Rotary,8 6 the court found several Title VII violations.
Among these, the court held that the plaintiff established cases of both
81. 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
82. 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983).
83. King, 778 F.2d at 878-79; Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1198.
84. King, 778 F.2d at 880; Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1204. The King court
stated that "unlawful sex discrimination occurs whenever sex is 'for no legiti-
mate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination.' " King, 778 F.2d at 880
(quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
The Toscano court appeared to believe that although the facts of the case
were not within the usual pattern of quid pro quo harassment, they were similar
enough conceptually to fit within that definition. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
The court noted this case differed from the "typical case [where] the female
plaintiff claims that her male supervisor requested sexual favors from her and
conditioned some job benefit, for example a promotion, on her assent," but
stressed that the "theoretical underpinnings" of both are the same. Id. In sup-
port of its conclusion, the Toscano court referred to § 1604.11(g) of the EEOC
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment. Id. According to this section, an employer
may be held liable to those employees who were qualified for an employment
opportunity but were denied it because the opportunity was granted to an em-
ployee who submitted to sexual relations with the employer. Id. (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1982)).
The Toscano court's concept of quid pro quo harassment does not comport
with the traditional fact patterns of previous cases. As one student commentator
stated: "[Qjuid pro quo harassment ... forces an employee to choose between
acceding to sexual demands or forfeiting job benefits, continued employment,
or promotion." Note, supra note 1, at 1454; see, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'don
other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The King court also chose to analyze the plaintiff's claim in the same way it
would if it were a claim of quid pro quo harassment, employing the disparate
treatment formulation of the order and burdens of proof. King, 778 F.2d at 880-
81. In doing so, the court probably shared the Toscano court's view that the
promotion claim and a quid pro quo claim have the same "theoretical underpin-
nings." Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
85. See supra note 84.
86. 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.8 7 In establish-
ing the hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff in Priest relied on
instances of conduct directed toward her.88 Only as an aside did the
court mention that the employer treated other employees in a similar
manner and that the plaintiff was aware of this harassment.8 9
Citing these three cases for the proposition that "Title VII is . . .
violated when an employer affords preferential treatment to female em-
ployees who submit to sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual na-
ture and such conduct is of common knowledge," the Broderick court
concluded that an evaluation of a plaintiff's work environment can in-
clude consideration not only of conduct directed at the plaintiff, but all
other behavior in the workplace relevant to the creation of a sexually
discriminatory and harassing environment.9 0 In further support of its
position, the court referred to dicta in Vinson v. Taylor 9 ' where the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that "[e]ven a woman who
was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim
if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment
was pervasive." '9 2
It is submitted that the Broderick court's approach to the evaluation
of the totality of the circumstances is a proper one. Implicit in a totality
of the circumstances test is the notion that all circumstances relevant to
the plaintiff's claim will be considered by the court. Where a hostile
work environment claim is concerned, it follows that evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances necessarily includes consideration of the
environment as a whole, since it is the environment itself that the plain-
tiff finds offensive. A consideration of the total environment must there-
fore include not only those incidents in which the plaintiff was involved,
but also incidents involving others of which the plaintiff was aware, pro-
vided they are relevant to the plaintiff's claim. Excluding from consider-
ation incidents not involving the plaintiff serves no valid purpose, but
renders it impossible for many employees, forced to tolerate hostile en-
vironments, to bring causes of action for sexual harassment.93
87. Id. It should be noted that the court also held that Title VII was vio-
lated because preferential job treatment was given to employees who engaged in
sexual relations with the employer. Id. at 581-82. The court offered no explana-
tion for this conclusion and considered this violation as separate from hostile
work environment harassment. Thus, although the Priest case was along similar
lines as Broderick, the Broderick court chose a different approach and incorporated
this kind of behavior into the theory of hostile work environment harassment by
way of the totality of the circumstances test.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 582.
90. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1277.
91. 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
92. Id. at 146.
93. It may be possible for a plaintiff to have a cause of action for sexual
discrimination in a case where her employer has on one or a few occasions given
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Because Broderick is the first case to find a sexually hostile work envi-
ronment in which the plaintiff was not the target of patterned and perva-
sive abuse, the decision may serve as a springboard for expansion of the
parameters of hostile work environment claims. If standing to sue no
longer requires injury sustained as a result of direct personal harass-
ment, the number of potential plaintiffs will greatly increase.
Although the court in Broderick determined that a hostile work envi-
ronment existed at the SEC, the court did not explain how it arrived at
this conclusion, except to state that because the conduct was so perva-
sive, "it can reasonably be said that such conduct created a hostile or
offensive work environment. ' 94 In determining the offensiveness of the
harassment, courts must choose a point of view from which to evaluate
the environment. 9 5 Courts often apply a reasonable person's perspec-
tive. 96 It has been suggested that a better approach is the use of the
perspective of a reasonable victim. 97 Because no uniform standards
seem to exist among the courts, it is unfortunate that the Broderick court
declined the opportunity to set forth its guidelines as to the determina-
tion of this issue.9 8 It is likely, however, that the Broderick court did not
engage in extensive analysis of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
claim because the facts of her case clearly indicated the pervasiveness of
the offensive behavior, such that either the reasonable person or the rea-
sonable victim would have been significantly affected by such an
environment.
The hostile work environment claim developed because women
needed a viable course of legal action in situations that fell outside of
the quid pro quo exchange.9 9 Until courts recognized the hostile work
environment cause of action, women were subjected to unwelcome sex-
preferential job treatment or promotions to employees with whom he was sexu-
ally involved, when the complaining employee was not in direct competition for
the particularjob opportunity. See, e.g., Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 581-82. However,
courts may vary on this question. An allegation of only one or two (in other
words, isolated) incidents of this treatment, however, would be insufficient to
establish a case of hostile environment harassment. See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at
1278.
94. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278.
95. Note, supra note 1, at 1459.
96. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. "[T]he trier of fact, when judging the totality
of the circumstances impacting upon the asserted .. .hostile environment...
must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar envi-
ronment under .. .similar circumstances." Id. For further discussion of this
perspective, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the reasonable victim's perspective, see supra note
72.
98. Some courts expressly state that the environment must be evaluated by
the reasonable person's perspective. However, most courts state only that,
based on the evidence, it must be reasonable to conclude that a hostile environ-
ment exists. Among these courts, there seem to be no guidelines for determin-
ing reasonableness.
99. See generally C. LEFCOURT, supra note 2, § 3.04 (discussing historical de-
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ual remarks, embarrassing conversations or other forms of verbal abuse
without any legal recourse.10 0 Once courts did recognize it, some wo-
men still were unable to seek legal redress for discriminatory working
conditions because courts refused to expand the definition of sexual
harassment beyond those incidents directed toward the plaintiff. If
courts elect to follow Broderick, sexual harassment claims will be accessi-
ble to more women and will aid in increasing employers' awareness as to
what conduct is and is not acceptable in the workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
As courts continue to hear hostile work environment cases, contro-
versy will no doubt increase over what should be considered actionable
harassment. The controversy will be especially sharp in marginal cases,
where the conduct alleged is different from the types of behavior in-
volved in previous suits. Given the initial judicial reluctance to consider
sexual harassment as anything other than normal social relations be-
tween men and women, it is likely that future attempts to broaden the
definition of sexual harassment will be met with similar hesitation. Such
a reaction would be unfortunate and costly because only through a legal
system responsive to the needs of women will women in the workforce
achieve equality of opportunity. Courts must allow sexual harassment to
be defined by the full range of women's experiences in the workplace. 1Oi
It is suggested that application of the reasonable victim's perspective
will provide for this needed flexibility. 10 2 This perspective should be
employed as a universal standard for evaluation of the reasonableness of
hostile work environment claims to deter courts from imposing personal
judgments as to the offensiveness of the particular work environment.
Jill W. Henken
velopment of causes of action for quid pro quo and hostile work environment
sexual harassment).
100. The only women who could assert causes of action for sexual harass-
ment were those who were victims of quid pro quo harassment. See, e.g., Miller
v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
101. See C. LEFCOURT, supra note 2, § 3.02.
102. For discussion of the reasonable victim approach, see supra note 68.
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